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I. Introduction
In 1996, Congress passed into law the Telecommunications Act.'
The law was aimed at deregulating the telecommunications industry,
including ownership restrictions.2  One part of the law, the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), exempted Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) and other "users" of an interactive computer service
from being held liable for any posted materials from third party
- Assistant Proffessor for the Department of Communications at Kennesaw State
University. B.A., Kalamazoo College. M.A., Political Science, University of Florida.
Ph.D., Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Florida.
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
2. 47 U.S.C. § 161 (2000).
"users" that were excessively violent, harassing, or defamatory In an
effort to promote self-regulation of the Internet, Congress wanted
ISPs and other "users" to be immune from liability if third parties
posted offensive messages.
Congress's goal in passing the CDA was to provide a legal
framework for the Internet to flourish in several areas, including
political discourse, cultural development, intellectual development,
and entertainment It opposed a law that restricted Internet growth;
instead Congress tried to preserve the "free market nature" of the
online communication medium.6 Congress did not want ISPs bogged
down by an avalanche of lawsuits related to questionable speech
practices by third parties. Lawmakers feared the potential for chilled
online speech from the 1995 Stratton Oakmont decision in New York.7
In the decision, the New York Supreme Court held Prodigy Services
liable for defamatory material that was posted on its "Money Talk"
electronic bulletin board.8 The court held that the ISP was the
publisher of the web site and responsible for the content the Money
Talk editorial staff posted.9
Congress responded to the Stratton Oakmont decision by passing
section 230 of the CDA. The 1996 Senate-House Conference Report
stated that one of the goals of the law was to overrule Stratton
Oakmont."° Congress wanted ISPs to be exempt from liability for
3. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2000) states: "No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be held liable on account of ... any action voluntarily taken in good
faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to
be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected."
4. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
5. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) states: "The Internet and other interactive computer
services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity." Section (a)(4) states:
"The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all
Americans, with a minimum of government regulation." Section (a)(5) states:
"Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political,
educational, cultural, and entertainment services."
6. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) states: "It is the policy of the United States... (1) to promote
the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and
other interactive media; (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by
Federal or State regulation .... "
7. Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. May 24, 1995).
8. Id. at 18.
9. Id. at 13.
10. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124.
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objectionable material written by unknown third parties." It did not
want ISPs and other "users" to be treated as publishers or speakers of
content that was not their own."
Federal courts have upheld Congress's authority to exempt ISPs
from liability when defamatory or threatening statements are made
on their servers. 13 They have ruled that the CDA exempts ISPs but
not the actual perpetrators of any threatening or defamatory online
materials. Several decisions have affirmed Congress's decision to
exempt ISPs from liability when they make a "good faith" effort to
restrict access to defamatory or other offensive material. 4
While the law exempts ISPs as distributors of information, it also
excuses "users" of interactive computer services from being held
liable when they also make available online material that is harassing
or defamatory." By exempting "users," the legal distinction of who is
a publisher of materials versus who is a distributor is important.
Companies such as America Online or Microsoft are typically
distributors because they make information provided by third parties
available to subscribers of their interactive computer services.
According to the CDA, these ISPs are distributors of information. 6
The law exempts a distributor from being held liable for any
defamatory information posted on its online information services as
long as it makes a "good faith" effort to restrict it.'
7
In November 2006, the Supreme Court of California issued a
ruling involving a private user who reposted defamatory online
material. 8  In Barrett v. Rosenthal, California's highest court
overturned a court of appeal ruling that defendant Ilena Rosenthal, a
11. Id. at 194. The Conference Report stated: "One of the specific purposes of this
section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which
have treated such providers and "users" as publishers or speakers of content that is not
their own because they have restricted access to objectionable material. The conferees
believe that such decisions create serious obstacles to the important federal policy of
empowering parents to determine the content of communications their children receive
through interactive computers services."
12. Id. at 194.
13. See Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998); Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465 (3rd Cir.
2003).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2000).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 230(c)(1) states: "No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider."
17. Id. § 230(c)(2).
18. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal.4th 33 (2006).
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member of an online news group, defamed the plaintiffs, Dr. Stephen
Barrett and Dr. Timothy Polevoy 9 The California Supreme Court
ruled that Rosenthal did not violate section 230 of the CDA, which
states providers or "users" will not be considered publishers or
speakers of any information provided by another information content
provider.0
The Barrett decision by the California Supreme Court leaves
three unresolved questions which this article will try to answer. First,
how does the CDA apply to conspiracies between two "users" of the
Internet where one is an unknown publisher and the other poses as a
distributor of offensive material? Second, according to federal law, is
an individual third party user of defamatory material virtually the
same as an ISP and, therefore, not held responsible for the
defamatory information? Finally, does the Barrett decision make
online defamation more likely? This article will attempt to answer
these questions by providing a detailed analysis of the Barrett
decision.
Part II of this article reviews several perspectives on the
controversy surrounding offensive content on the Internet and the
implementation of the CDA. The article, in Part III, will review the
Stratton Oakmont decision which spurred Congress to pass the CDA
that, in part, exempts ISPs and other "users" from culpability for any
posted online offensive content. Part IV analyzes the California
Supreme Court's Barrett decision. This article, in Part V, will then
review three federal court cases-Zeran v. AOL, Blumenthal v.
Drudge, and Green v. AOL-where the CDA was upheld and the
courts reiterated Congress's explicit intent in the law." The
conclusion will provide the answers to the unresolved issues that
arose from Barrett.
U. The Internet and Offensive Speech
As early as 1999, Stanford Law Professor Lawrence Lessig
opposed the idea of applying traditional American laws to
cyberspace. He attempted to show how the Internet's technological
characteristics promote free speech. In 1999, Lessig stated that, with
the anonymity of cyberspace and its continuing growth, traditional
19. Id. at 63.
20. Id.
21. See Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44; Green, 318 F.3d 465 (D.D.C. 1998).
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legal norms do not function as well in the arena of "controversial
speech."22 He said the Internet makes controversial speech likely and
easy due to relative anonymity, decentralized distribution, access at
multiple points, and the lack of physical ties to a specific geography.23
Essentially, there is no way to always identify the owner of Internet
content. The technology that makes the Internet possible also allows
''users" to encrypt who they are and how to locate them: "The
architecture of cyberspace is the real protector of speech there; it is
the real 'First Amendment' in cyberspace ... ,24
Like Lessig, John Cronan, in 2002, described the Internet as a
global communication forum. It is not simply a place for posting web
21
sites, but one including chat rooms and instant messaging services.
Cronan said it is possible that the communicator of an offensive
message could be literally anywhere on the planet where there is a
telephone or high-speed connection.26 The receiver of the message
would not know who communicated it or even where the sender is
located.
More recently, in 2006, Jonathan Zittrain, professor of Internet
Governance and Regulation at Oxford University, stated that when
significant numbers of consumers were online via ISPs, they enjoyed
a significant amount of power and freedom to post information to the
public at large or at least to other subscribers of their ISPs. 27 The
ability to communicate with someone anywhere in the world also
included the danger of disseminating defamatory messages.28 Zittrain
said the Internet made it easy for unidentifiable individuals to post
these messages.29 As in Stratton Oakmont, victims turn to third party
distributors for culpability." Zittrain argued that holding ISPs
responsible as publishers of offensive material would create an
atmosphere for chilling speech.3' He maintained that ISPs
successfully urged Congress to exempt them from the CDA.32 The
22. LAWRENCE LESSING, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 166 (1999).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 166-67.
25. John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for the First Amendment: The Framework for
an Internet Incitement Standard, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 425, 450 (2002).
26. Id. at 460.




30. Id. at 258.
31. Id. at 262.
32. Id.
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CDA gave ISPs the option to act as gatekeepers of information
without incurring any penalties if they chose not to screen for the
information.3
That same year, professors Doug Lichtman and Eric Posner at
the University of Chicago argued that ISPs should be held
accountable when their customers initiate dangerous cyber codes that
can harm other "users"' computers with viruses or some other anti-
security measures.' They stated that in the "offline world," where a
business agreement between two parties could lead to an offensive act
committed by one party, the second party could still be held
accountable.35 Lichtman and Posner argued that ISPs are in a good
position to reduce the number and severity of online harmful acts.36
While ISPs may be immune from liability, the authors stated that
Internet providers should be recruited to help enforce the law against
individuals who would initiate viruses on their online communication
platforms against other "users."37 According to Lichtman and Posner,
"Service providers control the gateway through which Internet pests
enter and reenter the system. As such, service providers can help to
stop these pests before they spread and to identify the individuals
who originate malicious code in the first place. ISPs should be
required by law to engage in these precautions.
3 8
David Myers, professor of law at Valparaiso University, stated in
2006 that the Internet makes "cyber targeting" common. 39 "Cyber
targeting" refers to the use of the Internet by students and young
adults in targeting one another with e-mail messages and even using
entire web sites devoted to publicly humiliating the individual with
vulgar and often sexual content.0 Myers said these types of actions
can lead to potential legal actions, including lawsuits based on
defamation and invasion of privacy.4' He supported a federal law that
remedies the increasing number of online defamatory incidents.
Citing the Zeran case and using an example from a colleague at the
33. Id. at 263.
34. Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable,
14 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 222 (2006).
35. Id. at 223.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 224-25.
38. Id. at 225.
39. David Myers, Defamation and the Quiescent Anarchy of the Internet: A Case
Study of Cyber Targeting, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 667, 667 (2006).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 668.
42. Id.
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Washington Post, Myers said that if the newspaper publishes a story
that defames someone, it is liable for that product. 3 Yet if the same
story appears on washingtonpost.com, the company would not be
liable under section 230 of the CDA." Myers pointed out there is a
double standard in the law. An ISP is not considered a publisher of
an online defamatory article; but a newspaper would be considered a
publisher for the print version of the same article. A possible solution
that Myers suggested is that section 230 of the CDA would grant
immunity to an ISP if it did not know about any offensive material,
but the ISP would be liable if it created the material.45
III. Stratton Oakmont Decision
In Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,46 the New York
Supreme Court held Prodigy Services liable as a publisher of
defamatory material. An unidentified user of Prodigy's "Money
Talk" electronic bulletin board accused Stratton Oakmont Inc., a
securities investment firm, and its president, Daniel Porush, of
committing criminal and fraudulent acts regarding the sale of stock. 7
Stratton Oakmont sued Prodigy and Money Talk's editor, Charles
Epstein, for libel. The court agreed with Stratton Oakmont, ruling
that Prodigy was responsible for Epstein's editorial decisions by citing
the ISP as the publisher of the libelous postings.48 Prodigy's editorial
staff, including Epstein, monitored and edited online postings to the
electronic bulletin board.49
The court said, "Computer bulletin boards should generally be
regarded in the same context as bookstores, libraries and network
affiliates. It is PRODIGY's own policies, technology and staffing
decisions which have altered the scenario and mandated the finding
that it is a publisher."5 As a publisher, Prodigy was responsible for
43. Id. at 672.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 677.
46. Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 299, *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
47. Id. at *1-2. The unidentified posted comment stated that the public stock offering
for Solomon-Page Ltd. was "major criminal fraud" and "100% criminal fraud." The
comment further stated that the decisions of Stratton Oakmont's President, Daniel
Porush, were "soon to be proven criminal" and that his company was a "cult of brokers
who either lie for a living or get fired."
48. Id. at *17.
49. Id. at *12.
50. Id. at *12-13.
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all content on its information services, including any offensive
postings."
The court also stated that "this decision simply required that to
the extent computer networks provide such services, they must also
accept the concomitant legal consequences."52 As long as a computer
service attempted to monitor the communications on its sites, then it
could be held liable as a publisher of offensive material.
IV. Barrett Decision in California
In Barrett v. Rosenthal, Ilena Rosenthal had posted a copy of an
article to a news group that was written by an unknown third party. 3
She had received the article in an e-mail message from co-defendant
Tim Bolen. 4 It accused Dr. Polevoy of stalking a Canadian radio
producer." Bolen had labeled the article "Opinion by Tim Bolen,"
even though he received it from an unknown third party. The article
accused Dr. Barrett of being "arrogant," "emotionally disturbed,"
and "a bully," among other accusations. 6 Rosenthal posted it on two
newsgroups devoted to alternative health practices and the politics of
medicine." She did not operate and manage these two discussion
groups. 8 Barrett and Polevoy argued that Rosenthal committed libel
by "maliciously" distributing defamatory statements in electronic
mails (e-mails) and Internet postings. 9  The doctors said these
messages impugned their characters.
51. Id. at *13.
52. Id. at *14.
53. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 41 (2006).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 40-41. Dr. Stephen Barrett and Dr. Timothy Polevoy directed the
Humantics Foundation for Women and operated an Internet discussion group. The
article, "Opinion by Tim Bolen," stated that Dr. Barrett is "arrogant, bizarre, closed-
minded; emotionally disturbed, professionally incompetent, intellectually dishonest, a
dishonest journalist, sleazy, unethical, a quack, a thug, a bully, a Nazi, a hired gun for
vested interests, the leader of a subversive organization, and engaged in criminal activity
(conspiracy, extortion, filing a false police report, and other unspecified acts)." Regarding
Dr. Polevoy the article said he "is dishonest, closed-minded; emotionally disturbed,
professionally incompetent, unethical, a quack, a fanatic, a Nazi, a hired gun for vested
interests, the leader of a subversive organization, and engaged in criminal activity
(conspiracy, stalking of females, and other unspecified acts) and has made anti-Semitic
remarks."
56. Id. at 40.
57. Id. at 41.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 40.
60. Id.
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The California Supreme Court said that Rosenthal was not a
publisher of the defamatory material." Rather, she was a "user" of
the material and did not violate section 230 (a)(3) of the CDA.62 The
Court stated that, by declaring no user may be treated as a publisher
of third party content, Congress had immunized republication of
defamatory content by any individual user.63 In the CDA, Congress
exempted from prosecution anyone who republishes information and,
therefore, becomes a publisher.6'
The Court noted that Congress, in writing the legislation for the
CDA, required the states to follow the federal mandate of the law.65
The Court said its decision was based on a "literal" interpretation of
the law. 6 While the court reversed the lower court of appeal decision
against Rosenthal, it said the plaintiffs were free to pursue the
originator of the defamatory material: the unsigned article.67
The Court noted the danger of their ruling: "The prospect of
blanket immunity for those who intentionally redistribute defamatory
statements on the Internet has disturbing implications. '" In his
concurring opinion, Justice Moreno went one step further. While he
agreed with the majority ruling, Moreno cautioned that the court's
ruling did not account for the danger of a conspiracy if a user actively
works with an information content provider to distribute defamatory
material online. 69 He stated that he did not believe the CDA provides
immunity in this situation."
A secondary issue that came before the Court was whether
Rosenthal-in her action of posting materials written by someone
else-engaged in active or passive use of the information in
question.7 ' The Court stated that categories of a "user" are not
defined in the CDA statutory language.7 ' According to Justice




65. Id. at 42. The court quoted from the CDA which states: "(3) State law. Nothing
in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is
consistent with this section. No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section."




70. Id. at 64.
71. Id. at 58.
72. Id.
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Corrigan, a user "plainly refers to someone who uses something, and
the statutory context makes it clear that Congress simply meant
someone who uses an interactive computer service. ,71 Congress
consistently referred to "users" of interactive computer services
without any further explanations.74
In Barrett, the Court'said that Rosenthal used the Internet to
gain access to newsgroups where she posted Bolen's article about
Barrett and Polevoy.7' She was therefore a "user" under the CDA.76
Polevoy asked the Court to distinguish between active and passive
Internet use so it could classify Rosenthal's actions as active and cite
her as a publisher of defamatory information. 7 Polevoy's argument
was that when a user receives offensive information, the individual
must screen (review) the posting and then decide whether to repost it
or remove it.78  He asserted that anyone who actively posts or
republishes information on the Internet is an information content
provider and not protected by the law's immunity provision.79
In disagreeing with Polevoy's argument, the Court said that his
view failed to account for the language that Congress created.80 The
CDA grants immunity to any "user." It never distinguished between
a user who removes a posting and another user who allows a posting
to remain online, therefore keeping it active.8' The Court agreed with
Polevoy that any user who actively selects and posts materials based
on its content fits within the role of publisher.' Yet the Court said it
was Congress's intent to immunize republication from liability.' No
meaning exists within the law to distinguish between active and
passive "users" of the Internet.84
The California Supreme Court's ruling was a literal
interpretation of the CDA, stating: "Until Congress chooses to revise
the settled law in this area, however, plaintiffs who contend they were
defamed in an Internet posting may only seek recovery from the




77. Id. at 59-60.




82. Id. at 62.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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original source of the statement., 85 Barrett was not the first decision
in which a court clearly pointed out Congress's intent in the CDA. In
Zeran v. America Online, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit upheld the law.86
V. Federal Courts Uphold CDA
A. Zeran v. AOL
In Zeran, Kenneth Zeran sued AOL because it did not quickly
remove messages from one of its bulletin boards that told its "users"
to call his telephone number to purchase "naughty Oklahoma T-
Shirts."'  The prank was posted online after the April 19, 1995,
Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building."
Zeran received a high volume of calls including angry messages and
death threats.89 He contacted AOL asking the company to remove
the message on one of its bulletin boards. The perpetrator of the
message was unknown.' Zeran received hundreds of angry messages,
often at the rate of one telephone call every two minutes.9 Zeran
sued AOL as both the publisher and distributor of the message.'
The District Court ruled that the 1996 CDA exempted ISPs such
as AOL from any liability for defamatory messages. 9' The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the decision.94 The court
stated that it could not hear any claims that would place an ISP in a
publisher's role.95 The law bars such lawsuits.
The unanimous court stated that Congress enacted the law to
"maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and,
accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a
minimum. ' The court wrote that the original, unknown, culpable
party was to blame-not AOL.' It encouraged law enforcement
85. Id. at 40.
86. Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997).
87. Id.





93. Id. at 329-30.
94. Id. at 335.




officials to locate the individual who posted the original message to
ensure that the perpetrator would be punished under the law.98 The
court warned that the law was needed to protect ISPs; without it, the
"specter of liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an
obvious chilling effect" on them.99 The court stated that AOL is like
any other online distributor of information in that it sometimes may
not know all of the contents on its server, including any defamatory
material.' °
The court said that Congress believed that the imposition of tort
liability on service providers for the communications of unknown
third parties was a form of government intrusion on freedom of
speech.' Section 230 of the CDA was enacted partly to ensure the
"robust" free speech nature of the Internet and to keep government
interference to a minimum." Up until the CDA was passed into law
in 1996, Congress maintained that the Internet was flourishing to the
benefit of all Americans.'0 3 The court believed that Congress wanted
the official policy of the U.S. government to be one of encouraging
the continued growth of online communications."
The court noted that the law does not excuse the original
culpable party that posts any defamatory messages.'9 The CDA still
called for "vigorous enforcement" of federal criminal laws that
attempt to deter online obscenity, stalking, and harassment.'
°
When the Zeran opinion was announced, the court stated that,
with the exponential growth of online communications, the "specter
of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an
obvious chilling effect."'" The court noted that it would be nearly
impossible for ISPs to screen each of the millions of postings for
offensive communication, including defamatory messages. If ISPs
attempted to do this, the consequence might severely restrict the
number and types of messages posted."" The court noted that
98. Id.
99. Id. at 331.
100. Id.






107. Id. at 331.
108. Id.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 30:1
Congress weighed this option but instead chose to immunize service
providers so they could avoid any chilling speech consequences."
While the Zeran decision focused on the potential liability of
ISPs, the federal appeals court made it clear that Congress's intent in
the CDA was to hold the publishers of defamatory material
responsible, not the distributors."0 It wanted to avoid the potential
legal pitfalls for ISPs who do attempt to control online content so
they are not placed in the roles of publishers and, therefore, liable for
defamatory materials."' One year after the Zeran decision, another
federal court would again reaffirm Congress's intent with the CDA.
B. Blumenthal v. Drudge
In 1998, in Blumenthal v. Drudge, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia exonerated AOL from any liability under the
CDA."' Sidney Blumenthal sued AOL and Matt Drudge over
defamatory statements that he had a record of spousal abuse."3
Blumenthal previously worked in the Clinton administration as an
assistant to the President. Drudge was the editor of the online
political newsletter Drudge Report. In the spring of 1997, Drudge
entered into an agreement with AOL making Drudge Report
available to AOL members. As part of the contract, AOL paid
Drudge $3,000 a month."' Under the agreement, AOL could remove
any content that the company determined violated its standard terms
of service.
On August 10, 1997, the alleged defamatory statements against
Blumenthal appeared on Drudge Report and were made available to
AOL members."5 The next day Drudge retracted the story and
apologized to Blumenthal."6 The court ruled that the CDA shielded
AOL from liability."7 AOL was exempted from liability because
Drudge was the author, and the ISP did not have any editorial




112. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 44, 46 (D.D.C. 1998).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 47.
115. Id. at 47-48.
116. Id. at 48.
117. Id. at 50.
118. Id.
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case. " 9 It noted that the only legal action available to Blumenthal was
his lawsuit against Drudge. Blumenthal never provided any evidence
that AOL had any responsibility for the content on Drudge Report20
The court also said there was no evidence that Drudge was ever an
employee or agent of AOL.2 ' Had Drudge and AOL jointly
developed Drudge Report, the court noted that the ISP could then
have been held accountable.122
Blumenthal argued that if the same material about his alleged
spousal abuse had appeared in a print publication such as the
Washington Post, then that newspaper would have been liable for the
defamatory material. The court agreed."2 Yet it noted that Congress
explicitly granted immunity to interactive computer providers.124 It
stated that Congress decided not to treat ISPs as print or broadcast
outlets of information.'" Those communication mediums might have
been liable for Drudge's story on Blumenthal had they not verified
the veracity of the allegations. Citing the Zeran decision, the court
noted that the intent of section 230 of the CDA was to exempt ISPs
from any responsibility for offensive materials.'26
The court, however, was sympathetic to Blumenthal's argument.
In a press release issued by AOL announcing its business deal with
Drudge, AOL mentioned that Drudge wrote articles often based on
gossip and rumor. 27  Blumenthal argued AOL should not be
permitted to tout someone as a gossip columnist or rumor maker who
might defame someone.'8 The court agreed. It said if AOL was
supporting Drudge then it should have taken responsibility for any
damage he might cause with his online postings. 9 Since AOL has the
right to exercise editorial control over those with whom it contracts,





123. Id. at 49.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 51.
127. Id. The press release stated in part: "Giving the Drudge Report a home on
America Online (keyword: Drudge) opens up the floodgates to an audience ripe for
Drudge's brand of reporting... AOL has made Matt Drudge instantly accessible to
members who crave instant gossip and news breaks."
128. Id.
129. Id.
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the liability standards of a publisher.13 Yet, the court said the law was
clear. The CDA provides immunity even when an ISP has an active
role in making content created by others available to its customers.131
While the D.C. District Court in Blumenthal was sympathetic to
Blumenthal's argument, its ruling parallels that of the California
Supreme Court. In Barrett, the Court sympathized with the doctors
as victims of defamation but ruled that the CDA still conferred
immunity to Rosenthal because she was a "user" of online material.132
In Blumenthal, the district court said that while it agreed with
Blumenthal's arguments, the CDA nonetheless grants immunity to
ISPs for any offensive materials posted by third parties; AOL could
not be held accountable as Drudge's publishing partner. Five years
later, in 2003, a court of appeals would again decide that the CDA
exempts ISPs from responsibility for third party offensive content.
C. Green v. AOL
In a third case regarding immunity for ISPs, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Green v. AOL upheld a lower district
court's ruling that AOL was statutorily immune from liability from
offensive content posted on one of its discussion groups.'33 John
Green sued AOL and "John Does 1 and 2" for transmitting harmful
messages in a chat room on AOL's server.' In his lawsuit, Green
accused AOL of failing to live up to its contractual obligation by
refusing to take quick and necessary action against John Does 1 and
2.135 Green wanted the ISP to compensate him with $400 in damages
to his computer from AOL and the two John Does.'36
Green alleged that John Doe 1 sent a "punter" through a chat
group, "Romance - New Jersey over 30," that locked up his
computer. 3 7 In a second incident, Green accused John Does 1 and 2
of using aliases in the chat group and sending defamatory messages to
its users alleging Green was gay.'38 On a third occasion, John Doe 2
130. Id.
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132. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal.4th 33, 63 (2006).
133. Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465,468 (3rd Cir. 2003).
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137. Id. at 469. A punter can prevent individuals from using their computers,
essentially "freezing" them up.
138. Id. Examples of the messages include: "SHELLS CAREFUL LAWYER IS BI"
and "LAWYER NO IMS FOR GAY SEX THX :))."
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allegedly impersonated Green in the chat room asking male
participants to participate in gay sex."9 In his complaint, Green said
he faxed AOL a log of the chat room discussion in which he stated




The U.S. District Court for New Jersey granted AOL's motion to
dismiss the case.' 2 The Third Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals
upheld the lower court's ruling stating section 230 of the CDA
provides immunity to AOL.143  The court cited Zeran in its
reasoning." It stated that the law does not require AOL to restrict
speech.45 Instead, it gives the service provider the right to establish
standards of decency for its chat rooms without risking liability for
doing so. 6 The court pointed out that, while AOL stated in its
Member Agreement that it would attempt to protect its "users," at
the same time the ISP did not assume any responsibility for content
provided by third parties. 147 According to the court, "Though AOL
reserved the right to remove messages deemed not in compliance
with the Community Guidelines, it expressly disclaimed liability for




In its decision, the court referred to the wording of the CDA that
grants immunity to ISPs for any defamatory content placed on their
web sites by unknown parties.49  As with the Zeran decision, the
Green court said that the law does not allow courts to view ISPs as
publishers of online content.' Additionally, in this case AOL did not
falsely represent itself and complied with its Member Agreement. 5'
VI. Conclusion
All four cases discussed in this article-Barrett, Zeran,
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''users" are immune from liability from online offensive content
published by third parties; the unknown publisher of the material is
liable for the content; and, Congress's intent in creating the CDA was
to protect the free market speech viability of the Internet.
Specifically, in Barrett and Blumenthal, while the courts were
sympathetic to the victims of defamatory messages, they reiterated
that the law specifically granted immunity to ISPs and other "users"
of the Internet.52 These companies and individuals cannot be held
responsible for the offensive postings of third parties.
This article answers three unresolved issues from the California
Supreme Court's Barrett decision. First, how does the CDA apply to
conspiracies between two "users" of the Internet when one is the
unknown publisher and the other is a distributor (user) of offensive
material? Second, by federal law, is an individual third party
distributor of defamatory material virtually the same as an ISP and,
therefore, not held responsible for the defamatory information?
Finally, does the Barrett decision make online defamation more
likely?
Regarding the first question, the CDA does not apply to
conspiracies between two "users" of the Internet in a scenario where
one individual plays the unknown publisher of offensive content who
in turn forwards the material to a co-conspirator-the user-who
then redistributes it. In Barrett, Ilena Rosenthal had forwarded an
article her friend had e-mailed her.53 While she did not know the
person who authored the article defaming Barrett and Polevoy, the
California court, nonetheless, said she had the right to post the
defamatory material onto another newsgroup's online discussion
group.' In a similar hypothetical scenario, Rosenthal could have
received an online message from an unknown third party who, in
reality, was her friend, Tim Bolen. Had Bolen written a message
using a pseudonym and sent it to Rosenthal for her to post onto
another discussion group, she would have still been protected by the
CDA. In his concurring opinion, Justice Moreno worried about such
a scenario. ' As the federal appeals courts ruled in Zeran and Green,
152. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52-53 (D.D.C. 1998); Barrett v.
Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 62-63 (2006).
153. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 41 (2006).




the unknown third party is still culpable, but tracking them down in
order to hold them accountable may be difficult.'56
The second question asked if, by law, an individual who reposts
offensive material is equivalent to an ISP. The answer is yes. The
CDA clearly states, "No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be held liable" for offensive content others created.'57
Neither an ISP nor a user is an information content provider.
According to the CDA, an information content provider "means any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the
Internet or any other interactive computer service."'58 An ISP is a
company such as AOL, Bell South, and Comcast that provides
Internet access and services to customers. An ISP can also exist when
a company provides Internet access to its employees. "9 Section
230(c)(2) of the CDA clearly equates ISPs with "users" of the
Internet. Neither an ISP nor a user is responsible for offensive
material placed on the Internet.
The third question asked if online defamation is more likely from
the Barrett decision. The California Supreme Court noted that the
CDA does not distinguish between active and passive "users" of the
Internet. It said the CDA never distinguished between a "user" who
removes a posting and a "user" who allows a posting to remain
online, therefore, keeping it active.' 6° The Court sympathized with
Dr. Polevoy that any user who actively selects and posts any material
based on its content fits within the role of publisher. 6' Yet the law
states that any user of an interactive computer service is immune from
liability. From this perspective, Internet "users" are always reposting
and forwarding information published by others. The likelihood that
this would include offensive content is high. The Barrett ruling makes
156. See Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Green v. AOL, 318
F.3d 465 (3rd Cir. 2003).
157. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2000).
158. Id. § 230(f)(3).
159. See Delfino v. Agilent Techs., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790, 795 (2006) A California
court of appeal ruled that an employer had no liability for an employee who was sued for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The employee used the company's Internet
services to threaten two other co-workers. The company, Agilent Technologies, was not
aware of the initial threatening messages and once it became aware of them, took
immediate action to rectify the situation. The court ruled that the employer was immune
under Section 230 of the CDA as a provider of an interactive computer service.
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[VOL. 30:1
it clear that "users" would not be held accountable for the
information they forward to others.
As long as Congress does not revisit the CDA and amend section
230 to no longer grant immunity to "users" who review and forward
objectionable online material, "users" will remain exempt from being
held liable for any offensive material they receive and then post or
forward on the Internet. With the Internet as a communications
platform for web sites, e-mail, instant messaging, and discussion
groups, there are plenty of opportunities for people to take advantage
of the CDA and use the Internet for "cyber targeting. 1 62 Publishers
will remain accountable, but individual "users" will continue to have
immunity under the law. Victims of online defamation who do not
know the true identity of their assailants will have little or no recourse
of action under the law.
162. Myers, supra note 39, at 667.
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